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This paper considers the implications of the current course of Italian 
fiscal policy for existing and future generations of Italians.  Italy has a 
very high debt-to-GDP  ratio as well as a significant Social Security program. 
These aspects of fiscal policy would,  by themselves,  raise concerns about the 
size of the burden to be passed on to future generations.  But the concern is 
compounded by the demographic transition under way in Italy.  Like the United 
States,  Japan,  and most other western European nations, Italy is "aging" due 
to its low fertility rate.  Unless this rate increases,  the proportion of 
Italians aged 60 and over will rise during the next four decades from 20 
percent to almost 30 percent.  At the same time,  the absolute size of the 
Italian population will fall by 27 percent.  The implication of this aging 
process is that there will be relatively few young and middle-aged  workers in 
future years to share the burden of the Italian government's massive implicit 
and explicit liabilities. 
To determine the size of the burden slated to be passed on to future 
generations of Italians,  we utilize a new technique for understanding 
generational policy -- generational accounting.  This approach indicates a 
huge difference in the projected lifetime net tax treatment of current and 
future Italians,  even after one accounts for the fact that future generations 
will pay more net taxes because of growth.  Unless Italian fiscal policy is 
dramatically and quickly altered, future generations will be forced over their 
lifetimes to pay the government four or more times the amount that today's 
newborns are slated to pay given current policy.  Such large payments may not 
be feasible,  because they could exceed the lifetime incomes of those born in 
the future.  If Italian generational policy is indeed on an unsustainable 
trajectory,  those Italians who are now alive will ultimately be forced to pay 
much more than suggested by current policy. 
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Generational accounting is a new technique developed by Auerbach, 
Gokhale,  and Kotlikoff (1991) and Kotlikoff (1992) to study the effects of 
government fiscal policy on different generations.'  It allows one to measure 
directly how much existing generations can  be expected to pay,  on  net, to the 
government over their remaining lifetimes.  The present value of the projected 
net payments by those now alive,  together with 1)  the government's net wealth 
and 2)  the present value of the projected net payments by future generations, 
must cover 3)  the present value of government spending on  goods and services. 
Generational accounting uses this equation -  the government's intertemporal 
budget constraint -  to infer the likely burden to be imposed on future gener- 
ations.  Specifically,  the technique involves projecting the present value of 
government spending, calculating the government's net wealth,  and,  as 
mentioned, estimating the present value of net payments to be made by current 
generations.  The present value of payments required of future generations is 
then determined as a residual. 
Generational accounting represents an alternative to deficit accounting 
for purposes of understanding generational policy.  Conventional deficit 
accounting has been criticized on a number of grounds, including failure to 
account for implicit government liabilities,  lack of adjustment for inflation 
and growth, failure to capture pay-as-you-go  Social Security and related 
policies, and neglect of policies that redistribute fiscal burdens across 
generations through changes in the market price of assets.  Though many 
economists have suggested adjusting the deficit to deal with these and other 
shortcomings,  deficit accounting has a fundamental problem for which no 
adjustment is available.  That is,  there is no economic basis for the tax and 
transfer labels that are attached to government receipts and payments. 
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describe these transactions, and as such,  it is entirely arbitrary. 
For example, the government is free to label workers' Social Security 
contributions "taxes" and retirees' Social Security benefits "transfers." 
Alternatively, it can call these contributions "loans" to the government while 
labeling retirees' benefits a "return of principal and interestn on these 
"loans,"  plus an additional "old age tax" that would be positive or negative, 
depending on whether the Social Security system was less than or more than 
actuarially fair in present value.  Using the second set of words rather than 
the first to describe the same economic reality alters not only the level of 
the reported deficit,  but also the sign of its changes over time.  This is not 
an isolated example; every dollar the government takes in or pays out is 
arbitrarily labeled from an economics perspective. 
Correcting the deficit for one or more of its alleged shortcomings does 
not, in the end,  avoid its primary drawback -  this labeling problem -  and 
eventuate in the measure of a well-defined economic concept.  Rather, it 
simply replaces one deficit based on arbitrary labels with another (see 
Kotlikoff [1989]). 
Generational accounting deals naturally with all of the concerns that 
have been raised about deficit accounting.  It considers inflation and growth, 
including growth stemming from demographic change.  It puts implicit and 
explicit government liabilities on an equal footing and thus avoids the danger 
of missing most generational redistribution.  Indeed,  generational accounting 
captures all of the policies that alter the generational distribution of 
fiscal burdens.  Most important,  it provides the answer to a major economic 
question,  namely,  whether the current course of fiscal policy,  unless 
modified,  will necessitate future generations' paying a much larger share of 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmtheir lifetime incomes to the government than current generations.  Thus, 
generational accounting exposes the generational imbalance in a nation's 
fiscal policy. 
Italy represents one country whose citizens should  be acutely concerned 
about such an imbalance.  It has one of the most generous pay-as-you-go  Social 
Security and welfare systems in the industrialized world.  In addition, after 
Belgium,  it has the highest official debt-to-GDP  ratio.  Finally,  its 
fertility rate is very low,  which implies that a declining number of citizens 
will be available to shoulder the government's huge implicit and explicit 
obligations. 
This paper develops a set of generational accounts for Italy that 
indicate an extremely serious imbalance in its generational policy.  Unless 
the Italian government makes dramatic changes,  future generations will face 
lifetime net tax burdens four or more times larger than those facing Italians 
who have just been born.  This estimate takes into account the fact that 
future Italians will have higher incomes because of economic growth. 
The paper proceeds by first describing general features of the Italian 
fiscal system and Italian demographics.  Section I1 introduces the method of 
generational accounting,  and section I11 details the data used in our 
analysis.  Baseline generational accounts for Italy for 1990 are presented in 
section IV,  which also explores the sensitivity of the accounts to growth- 
rate, interest-rate, and fertility assumptions.  The fifth section compares 
the Italian generational accounts with those for the United States.  Section 
VI then examines the factors behind the highly significant imbalance in 
Italian generational policy.  The seventh section considers alternative 
methods of equalizing the growth-adjusted fiscal burden on future and current 
Italians,  while section VIII discusses the likely effect of such policy 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfminitiatives on Italian  national saving.  The final section summarizes our 
findings  . 
I. Italian Fiscal Policy and the Italian Demographic Transition 
Measured relative to GDP,  the Italian government is much larger than its 
U.S. and Japanese counterparts,  but is comparable to the governments of other 
continental European countries.  As can be seen from table 1,  total government 
budgetary expenditures as a share of GDP are in line with those of Germany and 
France,  but are some 15 to 20 percentage points higher than in the United 
States and Japan.  Italy's larger expenditure/GDP  ratio is explained almost 
entirely by the greater importance of Social Security outlays (19 percent of 
GDP versus 12 percent and 10 percent in the United States and Japan,  respec- 
tively) and of interest payments (9 percent of GDP versus 5 percent and 4 
percent in the United States and Japan).  The ratios of tax revenue and Social 
Security contributions to GDP,  while higher than in America and Japan,  are in 
line with those observed in Germany and far lower than in France. 
Transfer payments to households and firms dominate the Italian govern- 
ment's  budget: In 1990,  Social Security and interest payments constituted 58 
percent of total outlays,  with public pensions taking the biggest bite (26 
percent).  Government wage and salary payments accounted for 24 percent of 
government expenditures, followed by interest payments at 18 percent.  The 
public pension system is based on a pay-as-you-go  scheme,  with contribution 
rates and benefits varying for private and public workers.  The Italian 
welfare system also covers other important aspects of life,  such as universal 
health care assistance,  unemployment compensation,  and a heavily subsidized 
education system. 
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payroll taxes.  In 1990,  each of these sources generated 37 percent of total 
revenue.  The most important direct tax is the progressive personal income 
tax,  which is applied to all income sources except interest income.  Interest 
income is taxed at a flat rate,  currently 30 percent for bank deposits and 
12.5 percent for government bonds.  Capital gains are taxed at a favorable 
rate in the case of real estate and are virtually tax exempt in the case of 
stocks and shares.  Corporate taxes are levied at a high nominal rate (more 
3  than 46 percent ), although generous depreciation allowances and a plethora of 
exemptions have reduced the effective tax rate,  particularly for manufacturing 
industries.  Relative to the United States,  a substantial fraction of revenues 
(26 percent versus 18 percent) is collected through indirect taxation,  partic- 
ularly through the value-added  tax (VAT) and taxes on petroleum products. 
Since the mid-sixties, Italy's  fiscal policy has been characterized by 
deficit spending.  The absorption of government bonds into private portfolios 
has been eased by Italian  households' high propensity to save,  an 
underdeveloped financial market, and,  until the mid-eighties, legal restric- 
tions on capital movements.  Prior to  the 1980s,  the growth of public debt had 
been damped by low -  and often negative -  ex post real interest rates. 
Since 1984,  however,  real interest rates on government debt have exceeded 
Italian growth rates,  placing the growth of public debt on an unsustainable 
path.  The Italian government has laid out several medium-term plans for 
halting the expansion of public debt,  but their outcomes have repeatedly 
fallen short of official targets.  Although the primary deficit has been 
shrinking since 1986,  the nation has been unsuccessful in running a large 
enough primary surplus to keep interest payments from growing faster than the 
economy. 
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lation are expected to undergo substantial changes.  Although the population 
has been growing,  albeit slowly,  in recent years, fertility rates have been 
below replacement since the 1970s, falling from 2.7 in the mid-sixties to 1.7 
in 1980 and 1.3 in 1990.  The latest figure is among the lowest in the indus- 
trialized world,  and portends important changes in the size and distribution 
of the Italian  population.  Table 2 reports these projected changes based on 
two fertility assumptions.  Under the first,  the fertility rate gradually 
rises over the next decade to the level required for replacement of the popu- 
lation (around 2.1).  Under the second,  the rate moderately recovers from its 
current exceptionally low value, and from 1991 on remains at the European 
Community rate (around 1.6).  The Italian  population is projected to fall 
under both scenarios.  Under the first assumption -  replacement-rate 
fertility -  total population shrinks by 8 percent by the year 2050 and 9 
percent by the year 2200.  Under the second assumption -  fertility constant 
at the EC average value -  the corresponding drop-off rates are 27 percent by 
2050 and 84  percent by 2200! 
Both fertility assumptions imply a rapid aging of the Italian population. 
Currently, 17 percent of Italian males and 23 percent of Italian females are 
aged 60  or older.  By the turn of the century, the corresponding figures will 
be 20 percent and 26 percent under both fertility assumptions.  And by 2030, 
more than 23 percent of Italian males and 29 percent of females will fall into 
this age group if the fertility rate rises to the replacement value.  The 
corresponding figures will be 26 percent and 32 percent if the rate remains 
constant at the EC average value.  Since a large fraction of the government's 
transfers are allocated to older age groups, the maintenance of current enti- 
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government spending. 
11. The Method of Generational Accounting 
To clarify the method of generational accounting,  we write the govern- 
ment's  intertemporal budget constraint for year t as 
D  a~  a~  s 
(1 
1 
Nt,  t-s 
+
  Nt,  t+s -  W:+G  n - 
S-0  S-1  S-t  j-t+l  (l+rj 1 
The first term on the left-hand side of (1)  is the sum of the present value of 
the remaining lifetime net payments of all generations alive at time t.  Net 
payments refers to all taxes paid to and all transfers received from the 
government (including local government and independent government agencies 
such as the Italian Social Security system).  The expression Nt,k  stands for 
the time t present value of remaining lifetime net payments of the generation 
born in year k.  A  set of generational accounts is simply a set of values of 
Nt,k  divided by Pt,k  (the generation's current population size in the case of 
existing generations, or initial population size in the case of future genera- 
tions),  with the combined total value of the NtSk's  adding up to the right- 
hand side of equation (1).  In  calculating the N  's for existing generations  t  ,  k 
(those whose lc11990),  we distinguish male from female cohorts,  but to ease 
notation,  we omit sex subscripts in equations (1)  and (2). 
The term Nt  ,k  is defined by 
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In this expression,  Ts,k stands for the projected average net payment to the 
government made in year s by a member of the generation born in year k.  By a 
generation's average net payment in year s,  we mean the average of payments 
made across all members of the generation alive in that year.  These payments 
include income,  payroll, and indirect taxes, less all transfers received, such 
as Social Security,  welfare, and unemployment insurance.  The term Ps,k stands 
for the number of surviving members of the cohort in  year s who were born in 
year k.  For generations born prior to year t,  the summation  begins in year t. 
For generations born in year k,  where k>t, the summation  begins in year k. 
Regardless of the generation's year of birth, the discounting is always back 
to year t.  In dividing the total present value of each generation's payments 
(the NtSk's) by its population size,  we are,  in effect,  discounting for 
mortality.  Dividing the term Ps,k in equation (2) by the generation's base- 
year population size forms a survival probability. 
Returning to the first term in equation (I), the index s in the first 
summation runs from age 0  to age D,  the maximum age of life.  The first 
element of this summation is Nt,t,  which is the present value of net payments 
of the generation born in year t;  the last term is Nt,t-D,  the present value 
of remaining net payments of the oldest generation alive in year t,  namely, 
those born in year t-D. 
The second term on the left-hand side of (1)  is the sum of the present 
value, as of time t,  of net lifetime payments of future generations.  The 
right-hand side consists of wgt,  the government's net wealth in year t,  plus 
the present value of government expenditures on goods and services.  In the 
latter expression,  Gs stands for government spending on public goods and 
services in year s,  and r  stands for the pre-tax rate of return in year j.  j 
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policy.  Holding the right-hand side of the equation fixed,  a decrease in the 
present value of net taxes paid by existing generations (a decrease in the 
first term on the left-hand side) requires an increase in the present value of 
net taxes paid by future generations (an increase in the second term on the 
left-hand side). 
To determine the aggregate present value of net payments required of 
future generations,  we simply solve equation (1) for the second term on the 
left-hand side.  While future generations, as a group,  can  be expected to pay 
this derived amount (given current policy),  there are many ways of allocating 
the collective burden among them.  To illustrate the size of the burden that 
will likely be imposed on future generations relative to current generations, 
we assume that the burden on each successive generation remains fixed as a 
fraction  of its lifetime income.  In  other words, the absolute fiscal burden 
of successive generations is assumed to grow at the same pace as their 
lifetime incomes,  which we take to be the growth rate of productivity. 
The construction of generational accounts involves two steps.  '  The first 
entails projecting each currently living generation's average taxes less 
transfers in each future year during which at least some of its members will 
be alive.  The second step converts these projected average net tax payments 
into a present value using an assumed discount rate and taking into account 
the probability that the generation's members will be alive in each of the 
future years (i.e.,  we discount for both mortality and interest rates). 
In projecting each currently living generation's taxes and transfers,  we 
consider first its taxes and transfers in the base year -  in this case, 1990. 
The totals of the different taxes and transfers in the base year are those 
reported in the Italian  National Accounts.  In these calculations,  we employ 
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general government deficit.  These totals are allocated to different genera- 
tions according to their age and sex distribution,  based on the Bank of 
Italy's  Survey of Households' Income and Wealth (SHIW) and ISTAT's  Consumer 
Expenditures Survey (CES).  Future taxes and transfers by age and sex are 
assumed to equal their 1990 values with adjustments for growth.  The calcula- 
tions presented here are based on yearly projections up to year 2200.  Three 
different interest- and growth-rate assumptions have been made, centered 
around our base-case  assumption of a 5 percent real interest rate and a 1.5 
percent productivity growth rate. 
As mentioned above, inferring the fiscal burden on future generations 
requires knowing not only the sum total of generational accounts of current 
generations,  but also the government's  initial net wealth position and the 
projected present value of its outlays for goods and services.  While in prin- 
ciple a measure of total net wealth is required,  we rely instead on an 
estimate of net financial ~ealth.~  Since assessing the value of real, 
nonmarketable wealth is difficult,  this estimate is derived in a manner 
consistent with the general government deficit reported in the National 
Accounts.  The present value of non-educational/non-health  government 
spending is projected assuming that its future per capita level remains 
constant except for an adjustment for growth.  We treat education and health 
spending differently from other government outlays.  Since these expenditures 
represent  purchases of goods and services by the government on behalf of 
specific age groups,  we consider them as additional age-specific transfer 
payments.  That is,  our estimates of the present value of net payments by 
current generations exclude the projected value of education and health 
spending on these generations. 
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assessments, they may be capitalized into the value of existing (old) assets. 
For example,  consider an increase in the nominal capital income tax rate in 
the presence of a provision that permits firms to deduct their new investment 
from taxable income immediately.  As described by Auerbach and Kotlikoff 
(1987) and others, this will lead to a fall in the market value of existing 
capital.  Although owners of existing capital will suffer a loss,  new 
investors will be unaffected.  For buyers of existing capital, the decline in 
its price will just make up for the higher tax on the future income that it 
will earn.  For buyers of new capital, the larger immediate deduction (the 
amount of the deduction is proportional to the tax rate) will compensate for 
the higher taxes levied on the future capital income earned. 
In this example, it would clearly be inappropriate to charge the higher 
capital income tax against the generational accounts of new investors (who are 
typically young or middle aged) rather than against the generational accounts 
of the owners of existing capital (who are typically old).  Instead,  genera- 
tional accounting ascribes to the owners of existing assets all inframarginal 
taxes capitalized in the price of their assets.  As discussed at greater 
length in Auerbach, Gokhale,  and Kotlikoff (1991),  owners of existing assets 
can  be viewed, from the perspective of generational accounting,  as possessing 
assets valued at replacement cost (rather than at market value),  but as owing 
a tax equal to the value of the inframarginal taxes capitalized into the 
market value of the asset. 
111. Data Sources and Construction 
Figure 1 reports the age and sex profiles for the appropriation account 
of  the general government,  as well as those relative to private net wealth, 
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profiles are derived for males and females in each of the 91  cohorts.  We 
obtain the relative profiles by benchmarking individual positions against that 
of a 40-year-old male. 
In  order to calculate the generational accounts,  receipts listed in the 
general government appropriation account are broken down into taxes on 
capital, labor,  and commodities,  Social Security contributions,  and other 
revenues.  The aggregate amount of taxes on capital and labor income is 
determined by allocating total income tax revenue to capital and labor 
according to their shares of national income.  We separate payments in the 
appropriation  account into spending on health,  education,  pensions,  unemploy- 
ment benefits,  household responsibility payments, other Social Security trans- 
fers,  and other programs.  The aggregate 1990  values of each of these 
different payments and receipts are then allocated by age and sex according to 
cross-section age-sex profiles,  which are assumed to be constant through time 
except for an age-independent shift to account for economic growth.  Thus, 
while relative receipts and payments across age groups do not vary over time, 
their absolute amounts expand at the economy's rate of growth. 
Income and consumption profiles are computed from SHIW data.  Since the 
survey records personal after-tax income,  we derive the amount of labor taxes 
paid on  these earnings by applying the methodology developed in Franco and 
Sartor (1990).  The profile for Social Security contributions is derived by 
applytng nominal Social Security tax rates to the estimated profile of gross- 
of-tax individual labor income taxes,  taking into account the industry,  type 
of worker,  and region of work. 
Revenue from direct taxes on capital is separated into marginal and 
inframarginal taxes,  according to the methodology outlined in Auerbach, 
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based on estimates and data reported in Giannini (1989).  We estimate that 
inframarginal taxes represent 36 percent of total corporate tax revenue. 
Marginal and inframarginal taxes on capital are imputed to each member of the 
cohort in proportion to hisher holdings of gross wealth (excluding real 
estate). 
We obtain the age and sex profiles for net indirect taxes by applying 
nominal consumption tax rates to each of the 185 goods surveyed in the ISTAT 
CES.  In the case of excise duties,  we derive the implicit rate of taxation by 
dividing the unitary tax by the average price of the good.  Since the survey 
records household,  not individual,  consumption, it was necessary to  impute 
total household consumption of each good to each member of the household. 
With the exception of consumer durables and those items whose consumption is 
age specific (such as toys or education fees),  all consumption expenditures 
are imputed assuming that each family member receives an equal share.  In the 
case of rent, the amount assigned to young household members (age 18 or less) 
is set equal to half the amount imputed to adults.  Consumer durables are 
imputed only to adults. 
On the benefit side,  the age profiles for health expenditures are taken 
from hospital and ambulatory care utilization profiles and from pharmaceutical 
consumption profiles, as described in Franco (1992).  For education, profiles 
are based on the Ministry of Education's  data on expenditures per student at 
each educational level (from nursery school to college).  Unemployment and 
short-term disability benefits and sick pay are imputed to citizens aged 20 to 
59,  assuming constant per capita payments.  Maternity benefits are imputed to 
females aged 20 to 39,  and severance pay provisions are imputed to citizens 
aged 55 to 65.  In  both cases, constant per capita payments are assumed.  For 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmpensions, profiles are taken from the SHIW,  while the profiles for households* 
"responsibility  payments" are those estimated by Franco and Sartor (1990). 6 
IV. Baseline Generational Accounts and Sensitivity Analysis 
Table 3 presents the baseline generational accounts for males and females 
at every fifth age for nine different combinations of growth and interest 
rates.  Here we assume, perhaps optimistically, that in the year 2000 the 
Italian fertility rate will reach the level required to stabilize the popula- 
tion (the replacement-rate fertility assumption of table 2).  All amounts are 
in 1990 dollars.  7 
The accounts indicate the average amount an individual in the specified 
age-sex group will pay in net taxes over the rest of hisher lifetime.  For 
example, assuming a real interest rate of 5 percent and a growth rate of 1.5 
percent, the projected present values of net payments of 40-year-old males and 
females are $95,500  and $6,300,  respectively.  Females pay much lower labor 
income and Social Security taxes because they earn less.  Notice that males 
aged 50 and over and females aged 45 and older have negative generational 
accounts.  Hence, they can expect to receive, in present value,  more in future 
transfers than they will pay out in taxes.  The size of the generational 
accounts first rises and then falls with age, reflecting the fact that young 
children are years away from their peak tax paying years,  whereas older indi- 
viduals are in or near their retirement years,  when they are on the receiving 
end of the government's  tax and transfer programs. 
To better understand the numbers in table 3,  consider table 4,  which 
decomposes the generational accounts into the present values of each of the 
various tax payments and transfer receipts.  In the case of 40-year-old  males, 
their generational account of $95,500  represents the difference between 
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projected present value of future transfers.  For 40-year-old  females,  their 
$6,300  reflects $129,600  in  projected taxes in  present value less $123,300  in 
projected transfers in present value.  The largest payment item for males of 
this age is Social Security contributions,  while for females it is labor 
income taxes.  On the receipt side,  the largest component for both sexes is 
Social Security pensions. 
In addition to detailing the remaining lifetime payments of current 
generations,  table 3 indicates in the next-to-last  row the payment required of 
the generation born in 1991,  assuming that it,  as well as every future genera- 
tion,  pays an equal amount after an adjustment for growth.  If the Italian 
government's fiscal policy were generationally balanced, the per capita net 
payment of those born in 1991 would equal the amount 1990 newborns pay times 
(l+g),  where g is the growth rate.  The last row in table 3 indicates the 
percentage difference between the 1990 newborns' net payment times (l+g)  and 
the net payment of those born in 1991,  under our illustrative assumption of 
equal growth-adjusted treatment of future generations.  Note that in 
calculating the burden on generations yet to come,  we assume that the ratio of 
the burdens on future males and females is the same as the ratio of the gener- 
ational accounts of newborn males and females;  i.e., we assume that in the 
future,  males will be treated by the fiscal system relative to females in the 
same manner as newborn males are slated to be treated relative to newborn 
females  . 
Comparing the first and next-to-last  rows in table 3 reveals a huge 
imbalance in the generational stance of Italian fiscal policy.  For the nine 
combinations of interest- and growth-rate assumptions,  the percentage 
difference in the treatment of future generations compared to those born in 
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on assumptions,  future Italians  will pay, in  present value, somewhere between 
2.7 and 7.0 times the amount that newborns are expected to pay given current 
policy.  Under our base-case  assumptions of a 5 percent real interest rate and 
a 1.5 percent rate of growth,  subsequent generations will pay almost four 
times what 1990  newborns do. 
As the table indicates,  the values one assumes for the interest rate and 
growth rates have an important effect on the size of the generational 
accounts,  as well as on the extent of the generational imbalance.  The higher 
these interest and growth rates are, the larger the absolute value of the 
generational accounts.  Higher interest rates increase the percentage 
difference in the accounts of current and future newborns,  while higher growth 
rates do the opposite. 
Although the generational policy imbalance indicated in table 3 is 
extremely large, it may,  nonetheless,  represent an underestimate of the 
problem for the following two reasons.  First,  the pension system has not yet 
reached full maturity.  Second,  the figures in table 3 are based on the 
replacement-rate  fertility assumption.  If  we instead calculate the burden on 
future generations assuming a nearly constant fertility rate (to be precise, 
constant age-specific fertility rates),  the percentage difference in the net 
lifetime payments of future and newborn Italians rises from 292.5 percent to 
365.9 percent.  Note that changing the assumption about future fertility 
leaves the generational accounts of current generations unchanged. 
V. Comparing Italian and U.S. Generational Accounts 
It  is instructive to compare the Italian  base-case  generational accounts 
with the U.S. generational accounts computed under the same interest- and 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmgrowth-rate assumptions.  Table 5 does just this,  highlighting a number of 
interesting differences.  First, the generational policy imbalance is much 
smaller in the United States.  The percentage difference in the treatment of 
future generations relative to current newborns is 292.5 percent for Italy, 
but only 28.6 percent for the United States.  Future Italian males (females) 
will pay $259,500  ($56,300), compared to $104,100  ($14,100) for future 
American males (females). 
While future Italians will pay more,  young and middle-aged Italians are 
slated to pay less than their American counterparts.  In the case of 40-year- 
old American males, the remaining lifetime net tax bill is more than twice the 
corresponding bill for 40-year-old  Italian males.  The larger Italian genera- 
tional imbalance is also reflected in the age at which net payments break even 
(that is,  the age at which gross payments to  the government equal benefits 
received).  In the case of both Italian  males and females, the break-even ages 
are 10  years less than those for their American counterparts.  This phenomenon 
is largely explained by the greater generosity of the Italian  pension system 
relative to that of the United States.  Compare,  for example, the $-111,200 
generational account of 70-year-old Italian males with the $-49,000 genera- 
tional account for American males of like age. 
A final interesting difference between the Italian  and American genera- 
tional accounts is the situation of males relative to females.  While Italian 
policy provides older females with higher net payments than does American 
policy, it extracts somewhat larger net payments from younger females and much 
higher net payments from future females. 
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Much of the generational imbalance in Italian fiscal policy reflects the 
pending demographic transition.  Under our base-case  interest- and growth-rate 
assumptions, the percentage difference in the treatment of future and newborn 
Italians falls by more than half (126.8 percent compared with 292.5 percent) 
if the population is assumed to experience no demographic change.  By no 
demographic change,  we mean that the number of people in each age-sex group in 
future years equals the corresponding 1990 population figures. 
A second important factor in explaining the generational imbalance is the 
high level of Italian debt relative to GDP.  As mentioned in section I, 
Italy's public debt has been on an unsustainable path since the mid-eighties. 
Blanchard et al. (1990) estimate that the gap between the actual primary 
balance and the level required in 1989 to avoid a debt-to-GDP  runaway was 
equal to 5.2 percent of GDP.  We estimate the effect of this tremendous short- 
fall on Italian generational accounts by assuming, counterfactually,  that the 
Italian debt is zero.  In this case,  the percentage imbalance in generational 
policy declines from 292.5 percent to 189.2 percent, indicating that while the 
government's debt accounts for about one-third of the imbalance in genera- 
tional policy, most of this imbalance has nothing to do with officially 
labeled government debt.  Thus, focusing solely on debt can  be highly 
misleading for assessing a government's generational policy. 
A  third critical factor underlying the generational imbalance in Italian 
fiscal  policy is the scale of the Social Security system.  To see the impor- 
tance of Social Security,  suppose that pension benefits were immediately and 
permanently reduced by 20 percent.  In this case,  the generational imbalance 
would decline by nearly half, from 292.5 percent to 153.3 percent. 
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on Italy's generational policy imbalance.  It also considers alternative 
combinations of the three.  If any two of the three experiments are combined, 
the 292.5 percent generational imbalance falls,  but only to between 50.6 
percent and 60.1 percent.  Thus,  the generational policy imbalance is so great 
that even two dramatic reversals of circumstances cannot close the gap between 
the fiscal treatment of current and future newborns.  If,  on the other hand, 
all three experiments are combined, the gap is closed; indeed,  it is more than 
closed,  as future generations end up paying 12.4 percent less than current 
generations. 
The imbalance in generational policy exposed here has been partially 
explored in a number of recent studies considering the future finances of the 
Italian Social Security system.  In 1986,  the Treasury's Technical Committee 
on Public Expenditure projected a substantial rise in the theoretical equi- 
librium Social Security tax rate (i.e., the ratio of total pension benefits to 
total income,  subject to pension contributions) for the Employee Pension Fund 
(see Franco and Morcaldo [1986]).  Recent estimates by the National Institute 
for Social Security (INPS [1991]) and the State Accounting Office (Ragioneria 
Generale dello Stato [1991]) concur on the seriousness of the problem.  INPS 
projects the rate to rise from 39.5 in 1990 to 45 percent in 2010,  while the 
State Accounting Office pegs the rate at 48  percent in 2010 and 57 percent in 
2025. 
VII. Alternative Tax Policies to Restore Generational Balance 
An alternative way to understand the magnitude of Italy's generational 
imbalance is to consider how much alternative tax rates would need to be 
raised to restore balance.  For example,  it would take an immediate and 
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12.4  percent to 21.4  percent to accomplish this.  As indicated in the first 
column of table 7,  an increase of this magnitude raises the generational 
accounts of all current generations.  For middle-aged males, net lifetime 
payments rise, in present value,  by between $30,000  and $60,000.  For middle- 
aged females,  the increase ranges from $20,000  to $35,000. The large addi- 
tional payments of these and other currently living generations permit a 
significant decline in the fiscal burden of future generations,  with males 
paying $161,700  less and females paying $19,200  less. 
Of course,  raising labor income taxes is not the only way to restore 
generational balance.  Columns two, three,  and four of table 7 show the 
changes in generational accounts if Social Security contributions,  capital 
income taxes, or indirect taxes are raised instead.  While the impact on 
future generations is similar regardless of which tax is increased,  the 
distribution of the additional burden across current generations is quite 
sensitive to the choice of tax instrument.  Compare,  for example, rectifying 
the imbalance by raising Social Security taxes with the alternative of 
increasing capital income taxes.  For Italians aged 60  and over, the former 
policy involves a very small increase in their remaining lifetime payments, 
while the latter results in a significant rise.  This difference simply 
reflects the fact that older Italians are, in the main, retired and subject to 
low Social Security taxes.  On the other hand, they pay a significant 
percentage of capital income taxes, reflecting their considerable share of 
total Italian wealth. 
Since an immediate and permanent increase in tax rates that restores 
generational balance seems unlikely, table 8  explores more realistic -  though 
still quite painful -  initiatives that would close the gap between the treat- 
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tional accounts resulting from three different policies.  The first involves 
an equal revenue switch from Social Security payroll taxation to indirect 
ta~ation.~  The second involves a 63  percent increase in income tax rates for 
10  years,  which would lower the Italian debt-to-GDP ratio to about 0.6 by the 
turn of the century.  (A  debt-to-GDP  ratio of this magnitude is one of the 
requirements proposed by the EC for participation in the European monetary 
union.)  The third policy involves a gradual reduction in Social Security 
pension benefits.  Under this scheme,  pensions would ultimately be lowered by 
20 percent, but the reduction  would occur over a 10-year period,  with benefits 
being cut by 2 percent per year. 
The first policy, replacing Social Security payroll taxation with 
indirect taxation,  has little effect on the percentage difference in the 
treatment of future and newborn Italians,  but redistributes substantial sums 
between males and females.  Males currently pay a much larger percentage of 
total payroll taxes than do females,  reflecting their larger share of total 
labor earnings.  Incontrast,  the male share of indirect tax payments is quite 
close to the female share.  Hence,  switching from payroll to indirect taxes 
moves the fiscal system away from a tax paid primarily by males toward one 
paid by both sexes.  For 40-year-old males, this "revenue-neutral" change in 
tax bases reduces their remaining lifetime net tax bill by $37,500,  while it 
increases the bill of 40-year-old females by $26,700.  Future males also 
benefit greatly from this provision,  but the gain to future generations of 
Italians is almost completely offset by the loss to future females. 
The second policy, cutting the ratio of public debt to GDP from 0.9 to 
0.6,  reduces the percentage difference in the treatment of future and'newborn 
Italians by raising the net payments of all those currently alive,  with the 
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newborn generations is reduced from 292.5 percent to 204.7 percent, with the 
adjustment mainly borne by middle-aged  individuals,  who are close to their 
peak income tax paying years. 
The third policy,  gradually cutting Social Security benefits by 20 
percent, is more effective than the previous one in reducing intergenerational 
imbalance.  Furthermore,  its intragenerational  effects are different in that 
it redistributes substantial sums from older Italians toward younger and 
future citizens.  The percentage gap in the treatment of future and newborn 
generations is reduced from 292.5 to 170.4 percent,  with 60-year-old males 
paying $22,900  more and 60-year-old  females paying $19,900  more.  The growth- 
adjusted benefit to future males is $68,100;  for future females, it is $6,200. 
VIII. The Impact of Alternative Tax Policies on National Saving 
This section considers the likely impact on national saving of the 
various fiscal policy experiments described in the previous section.  Specifi- 
cally, for each policy,  we first multiply each living generation's marginal 
propensity to consume out of lifetime resources by the projected policy- 
induced change in its account.  We then sum these products across all living 
generations to determine the aggregate change in consumption. 
Let Xck be the marginal propensity to consume out of lifetime wealth for 
a typical member of the generation  born in year k,  and let ANj  t,k  represent 
the present-value change induced by policy j in the remaining lifetime net 
payments of the generation born in year k (where j ranges from one to seven, 
corresponding to the policies described in tables 7 and 8).  Then the effect on 
national saving at time t,  when the policy is implemented, is equal to 
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consumption of all generations alive at time t. 
'  To compute the marginal propensities to consume out of lifetime 
resources,  we first estimate lifetime wealth for each individual born in year 
k.  Our methodology is outlined in the appendix.  Under the assumption of 
homothetic preferences, marginal and average propensities coincide and are 
estimated by the average ratio of current consumption by each individual in an 
age/sex cohort to hisher lifetime resources.  The last rows of tables 7  and 8 
report the net national saving rate,  as a percentage of net national income, 
induced by the corresponding policy.  Recall that the net national saving rate 
in 1990 was around 8.6 percent.  Hence, the effect of the policies represented 
in these tables is to more than double that rate. 
The four policies described in table 7  call for reducing living genera- 
tions' consumption by between 10 and 12 percent -  a considerable sacrifice. 
However, since the various policies are differently distributed across age and 
sex,  they also have different implications for the level of total current 
consumption and national saving.  Restoring generational balance through 
either indirect taxation or raising taxes on capital has the largest impact on 
national saving,  while increasing Social Security contributions  has the 
smallest. 
The policies described in table 8  have a less significant impact on 
national saving.  In the case of switching from Social Security taxation to 
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percentage points.  It rises by 4.4 percentage points if Social security 
benefits are reduced by 20 percent over 10 years,  and by 3.6 percentage points 
if the debt/GDP ratio is scaled back to 0.6 over 10 years. 
IX. Summary and Conclusion 
A  serious imbalance exists in Italy's generational policy.  Unless major 
and quite painful steps are taken soon,  future generations of Italians will be 
forced to pay over their lifetimes four or more times the net taxes expected 
to be collected from current young Italians.  This generational imbalance 
reflects the combination of an explicit liability to service huge amounts of 
government debt and an implicit liability to pay substantial sums to existing 
generations in the form of pension and health benefits.  Were there a large 
I 
I  projected number of future Italian workers to share these burdens, the 
liabilities would be less troubling.  But the Italian population is rapidly 
aging and declining. 
A  large variety of measures can be used to bring Italian fiscal policy 
into generational balance.  For example, the government could raise income 
taxes.  The current average rate of taxation on total income (capital plus 
labor income) is 14  percent.  To bring Italian policy into generational 
balance would require immediately and permanently raising the average income 
tax rate to 23 percent.  Precisely which fiscal measures are taken and how 
quickly they are implemented will determine how the burden of adjusting to 
generational balance will be distributed over different generations.  One 
thing is clear,  however.  The longer the delay in making the adjustment to a 
balanced course of policy, the larger will be the generational imbalance that 
needs to be addressed.  In our base-case  calculations, future generations will 
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the former.  But  this calculation assumes that those born  in the immediate 
future will share in the larger lifetime net tax burden.  Suppose,  instead, 
that the next 10 generations of  Italians are let off  the hook  and  treated in 
the same  manner  as current newborns  are projected to be  treated.  Then  those 
born  after the  turn of  the century will  be  left with a growth-adjusted 
lifetime net tax bill that is five rather than four times larger than the bill 
facing current newborns. 
Even  a four-times  larger lifetime generational account  for future genera- 
tions may  be  infeasible, however,  since the required net payments may  exceed 
the present value of  these generations'  labor earnings.  If this is indeed the 
case,  then policy will have  to be  adjusted in a manner  that raises the 
lifetime net payments  of  Italians now  alive. 
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FOOTNOTES 
See also Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1992a and 1992b). 
'  Consider a policy that lowers the market price of an asset, such as a 
tax on land.  Since the sellers of land are,  on average,  older generations, 
while the purchasers of land are,  on average,  younger generations,  such a 
policy redistributes between the old and young.  The physical land itself is 
unchanged,  but the old are forced to sell their holdings at a lower price, 
benefiting the young purchasers. 
The corporate tax rate was set at 47.826 percent in 1991. 
The derivation of a correct measure of nonfinancial wealth is an 
extremely complex task,  as it involves adjusting the general government's 
appropriation account through the following steps: 
i)  Assessment of the market value of general government's real assets, 
including historic buildings and building sites as well as loss-generating 
public enterprises; 
ii)  Inclusion among current costs of the rents on those assets currently 
being used by general government (such as government buildings); 
iii) Exclusion from revenues the profits, dividends,  and other income 
currently earned on assets. 
More precisely, our measure of net financial wealth has been derived 
by capitalizing net interest payments (i.e.,  interest payments minus interest 
income) at the nominal before-tax  interest rate levied on newly issued govern- 
ment bonds (currently around 12 percent).  According to this measure, net debt 
in 1990  was equal to 77 percent of GDP. 
It should be noted that the Italian pension system has not yet reached 
full maturity.  The ratio of the average pension benefit to per capita GDP is 
likely to increase significantly in the future. 
The exchange rate used for calculation was 1,257  lire per dollar. 
More precisely, the average indirect tax rate is increased to the 
level required to offset the revenue loss arising in the base year from the 
reduction in the Social Security tax rate.  In the following years,  revenue 
neutrality need not occur. 
As previously noted,  the ratio of the average pension benefit to per 
capita GDP is likely to increase in the absence of policy action. 
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Estimation of lifetime resources and of the marginal propensity to consume 
Lifetime resources at time t for an individual born in  year k  is the sum 
of nonhuman plus human wealth.  Human wealth is defined to include not only 
the present value of after-tax future earnings,  but also the present value of 
Social Security benefits; i.e., the level of  pension wealth.  Of course,  for a 
retired individual,  human wealth is equal to the value of pension wealth.  To 
estimate lifetime resources,  we use the 1989 SHIW,  which contains information 
on the value of household net worth, earnings and pension income,  and personal 
characteristics such as age,  sex,  years of education, and occupation. 
The overall sample of income recipients (14,552  observations) is split 
into two parts.  The first includes working persons over age 16 and below 60 
(the retirement age is 55 for women);  the second group includes retirees over 
age 60 (55 for women) and below 91 (maximum length of life) whose income 
derives only from Social Security benefits.  The pension wealth of the last 
group is computed by taking the present value of Social Security benefits. 
Here,  we assume that future benefit levels will remain  constant at the 
currently observed value for each person. 
To account for the rapidly increasing  probability of death once average 
life expectancy has been reached,  the discount rate in the computation of the 
pension  wealth portion of lifetime resources is set equal to 12  percent. 
For the first group,  we estimate pension wealth following the previous 
procedure after setting the level of Social Security benefits at 80  percent of 
the projected earnings at age 60 (see below);  the assumption is that all 
members of the male labor force retire at this age (55 for females).  To 
compute the other portion of human wealth,  we first fit a weighted least 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmsquares regression of current earnings against a vector of demographic charac- 
teristics and a second-order age polynomial to allow for cohort effects (see 
table 9). 
For an individual born in year k,  the fitted value of earnings at time t 
is 
where Xk  is the vector of characteristics of the specific individual aged t-k. 
Projected earnings j years ahead are computed as 
where g is the productivity growth rate (1.5 percent per year).  Thus,  the 
present value of earnings is given by 
6  0 
H~  =  m (  l+r) ('-')-I  yt+i-( t-k) , 
i-t-k 
where the discount rate, (l+r),  is set at 1.05. 
For each individual,  lifetime wealth is then obtained by adding hisher 
human wealth and share of household net holdings of real and financial assets, 
according to the method of division defined in section 111. 
Individuals below age 16 are assumed to own only human wealth.  This is 
computed  by appropriately discounting their average human wealth at age 17 - 
the age at which they are assumed to enter the labor force.  Thus, lifetime 
7  resources of 10-year-olds  is given by  (1 + g)  (1 + r)-7  HI7, where H17 is the 
average value of the human wealth of 17-year-old workers. 
We assume that young dependents (below 28 years) who have not yet entered 
the work force will start working within a year, and we impute to them the 
human wealth of workers who are a year older,  with appropriate adjustments for 
growth and discounting. 
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sample,  the average and marginal propensities to consume are computed by 
dividing each generation's  consumption (imputed according to the methodology 
described in section 111) by its average lifetime resources.  The age pattern 
is shown separately in figure 1 for males and females. 
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Source: Authors'  calculations based on National Income and Product Accounts 
for various countries. 
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Projected Size and Age-Sex  Distribution of the Italian Population, 1990-2050 
Fraction of Males in Specified Age Groups 
Re~lacement-Rate  Fertility  bveraee EC Fertility 
1990  2010  2030  2050  - -  1990  2010  030  2050 
0-17  .230  .231  .231  .245  .230  .207  .186  .I81 
18-25  .I33  .096  .lo6  -109  .I33  .099  .089  .093 
26-49  .339  .347  .296  .321  .339  .357  .317  .312 
50-59  .I22  .I29  .I32  .I18  .I22  .I32  .I47  .I51 
60+  .I73  .I96  .232  .205  .I73  .202  .258  .262 
Total Males 
(millions)  27.7  27.9  27.0  25.8  27.7  27.1  24.3  20.2 
Fraction of Females in Specified Age Groups 
1990  2010  2030  2050  - -  -  1990  2010  2030  2050 
0-17  .206  .207  .209  .222  .206  .185  .I66  .I60 
18-25  .I21  .087  .096  .lo0  .I21  .089  .080  .082 
26-49  .320  .320  .271  .295  .320  .328  .288  .280 
50-59  .I23  .I27  .I27  .I14  .I23  .I30  .I40  .I42 
60+  .228  .258  .294  .267  .228  .265  .324  .333 
Total Females 
(millions)  29.4  29.3  28.3  26.9 
Source: Authors' calculations based on population projections obtained from 
the Banca dlItalia. 
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kcants for Age  Zero ad  Future Femle Garratirmi 
Generation's 
Age  in  1990 
Future 
Generations 
(thousands of dollars) 
Source:  Authors1  calculations. 
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The  Caqositim of Hale 6enwatiaull Acunnts <r=.05,  g=.015) 
Present  Values of  Receipts  and  Payments 
(thousands of  do1 Lars) 
Payments  Receipts 
Generation's  Net  Direct  Social  Indirect Direct  Seign.  Other  Pension  Health  Other  Househ. 
Age  in 1990  Payment  Taxes  Sec.  Taxes  Taxes  Reven.  Benefits  Soc.Sec.  Respon. 
Labor  Contr.  Capital  Benef .  Paw1  ts 
Future 
Generations  259.5 
Educa- 
tion 
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Age  in 1990  Payment  Taxes 
Labor 
Table 4 (continued) 
The mition  of  Faele Gematianel AccMts (r=.05,  g=.015) 
Present Values  of Receipts  and  Payments 
(thousands of dollars) 




Indirect Direct  Seign.  Other 
Taxes  Taxes  Reven. 
Capita 1 
Pension  Health  Other  Househ.Educa- 
Benefits  Soc.Sec.  Respan.  tion 
Benef.  Paymfts 
Future 
Generations  56.3 
Source:  Authorsf  calculations. 
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A Comparison of Italian and U.S. Generational ~ccounts 
(thousands of dollars) 
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Source  : Authors' calculations. 
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Understanding the Source of Generational Imbalance in Italian Fiscal Policy 
Percentage Difference in Generational Accounts of Future Italians 
and 1990 Italian Newborns 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
No Demographic  Lower Social 
Base Case  Change  Zero Debt  Securitv Benefits 
Percentage 
Difference  292.5  126.8  189.2  153.3 
: Percentage 
Difference  59.3  50.6 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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Changes in Generational Accounts Required to  Attain Generational Balance 
(thousands of dollars) 





2  0 
3  0 
40 
5  0 
60 
7  0 







2  0 
3  0 
40 
5  0 
60 
7  0 












































Source: Authors' calculations. 
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Changes in Generational Accounts Arising from Three Hypothetical Policies 
(thousands of dollars) 
Switching from  Reducing Debt/GDP  Cutting Social 
Social Security to  Ratio to .6  Security Benefits 
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to Save  10.9 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
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Earnings Function Estimates 
1  (dependent variable: individual earnings ) 








Operative and laborer  -4,716.3  -16.9 
Clerical  -3,247.7  -10.4 
Precision craft  886.1  1.7 
Professional  5,398.8  8.1 
Manager  11,418.7  8.9 
Entrepreneur  21,005.9  9.8 







Constant  2,905.8  3.2 
Adjusted R~  .78 
Standard error  507.7 
Dependent variable mean  30,633.3 
No. of observations  9,290 
The equation has been estimated by weighted least squares using the fitted 
values of an OLS first-stage regression as weights. The sample of 9,290  obser- 
vations excludes individuals with zero labor earnings, those not in the labor 
force,  and those older than 65.  The dependent variable is expressed in thou- 
sands of 1989 lire. 
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Source: Authors' calculations. 
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